94 lines
3.2 KiB
ReStructuredText
94 lines
3.2 KiB
ReStructuredText
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Reading List
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================
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These are papers, articles and books that are interesting or useful from the
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perspective of crypto implementation.
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Papers
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--------
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Implementation Techniques
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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* "Randomizing the Montgomery Powering Ladder"
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Le, Tan, Tunstall https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/657
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A variant of Algorithm 7 is used for GF(p) point multplications when
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BOTAN_POINTGFP_BLINDED_MULTIPLY_USE_MONTGOMERY_LADDER is set
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* "Accelerating AES with vector permute instructions"
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Mike Hamburg https://shiftleft.org/papers/vector_aes/
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His public doman assembly code was rewritten into SSS3 intrinsics
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for aes_ssse3.
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* "Elliptic curves and their implementation" Langley
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http://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/12/04/ecc.html
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Describes sparse representations for ECC math
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Random Number Generation
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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* "On Extract-then-Expand Key Derivation Functions and an HMAC-based KDF"
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Hugo Krawczyk http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.131.8254
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RNG design underlying HMAC_RNG
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AES Side Channels
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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* "Software mitigations to hedge AES against cache-based software side
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channel vulnerabilities" https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/052.pdf
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* "Cache Games - Bringing Access-Based Cache Attacks on AES to Practice"
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http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2011/PAPERS/2011/paper031.pdf
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* "Cache-Collision Timing Attacks Against AES" Bonneau, Mironov
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http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.88.4753
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Public Key Side Channels
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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* "Fast Elliptic Curve Multiplications Resistant against Side Channel Attacks"
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http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.98.1028&rep=rep1&type=pdf
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* "Resistance against Differential Power Analysis for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems"
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Coron http://www.jscoron.fr/publications/dpaecc.pdf
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* "Further Results and Considerations on Side Channel Attacks on RSA"
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Klima, Rosa https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/071
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Side channel attacks on RSA-KEM and MGF1-SHA1
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* "Side-Channel Attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter Public-Key Cryptosystems"
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Avanzi, Hoerder, Page, and Tunstall https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/479
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* "Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance
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of Elliptic Curve Implementations" BSI
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https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Zertifizierung/Interpretationen/AIS_46_ECCGuide_e_pdf.pdf
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Books
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------
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* "Handbook of Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography"
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Cohen and Frey https://www.hyperelliptic.org/HEHCC/
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An excellent reference for ECC math, algorithms, and side channels
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* "Post-Quantum Cryptography" Bernstein, Buchmann, Dahmen
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Covers code, lattice, and hash based cryptography
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Standards
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-----------
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* IEEE 1363 http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/
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Very influential early in the library lifetime, so a lot of terminology used
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in the public key (such as "EME" for message encoding) code comes from here.
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* ISO/IEC 18033-2 http://www.shoup.net/iso/std4.pdf
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RSA-KEM, PSEC-KEM
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* NIST SP 800-108
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http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf
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KDF schemes
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* NIST SP 800-90A
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http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf
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HMAC_DRBG, Hash_DRBG, CTR_DRBG, maybe one other thing?
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